Columbia University Community Measurement Resources: Routing Experiments for the Cloud Era with the PEERING Testbed & A New Dataset of Packet Captures from a Residential Network

Ethan Katz-Bassett

Ítalo Cunha

Ezri Zhu

Jiangchen Zhu

Tom Koch

Gil Zussman

Shuyue Yu

U F *M* G

Ilgar Mammadov

Carson Garland

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

EzriCloud (AS206628)


Updates on two community resources — please use them!

PEERING BGP testbed

• Exchange BGP routes and traffic with thousands of ASes at locations around the world


Residential traffic traces

- Packet traces from ~1000 residences
 - Plan to scale to 8000 units, 24x7































2. Either:








a. Many sites use same address (anycast),








- 2. Either:
 - a. Many sites use same address (anycast),










- 2. Either:
 - a. Many sites use same address (anycast), and Internet BGP routing picks both site and route to it










- 2. Either:
 - a. Many sites use same address (anycast), and Internet BGP routing picks both site and route to it
 - b. Each site uses its own address (unicast),









- a. Many sites use same address (anycast), and Internet BGP routing picks both site and route to it
- b. Each site uses its own address (unicast),








- a. Many sites use same address (anycast), and Internet BGP routing picks both site and route to it
- Each site uses its own address (unicast), DNS picks a site, and BGP picks a route to it










- a. Many sites use same address (anycast), and Internet BGP routing picks both site and route to it
- Each site uses its own address (unicast), DNS picks a site, and BGP picks a route to it







Challenges to improving paths from clients to cloud




- a. Many sites uses same address (anycast), and Internet BGP routing picks both site and route to it
- b. Each site uses its own address (unicast), DNS picks a site, and BGP picks a route to it

Challenging to understand:



Challenges to improving paths from clients to cloud




- a. Many sites uses same address (anycast), and Internet BGP routing picks both site and route to it
- b. Each site uses its own address (unicast), DNS picks a site, and BGP picks a route to it

Challenging to understand:

1. Depends on BGP routing policy and DNS caching policy outside cloud control



Challenges to improving paths from clients to cloud




- 2. Either:
 - a. Many sites uses same address (anycast), and Internet BGP routing picks both site and route to it
 - Each site uses its own address (unicast), DNS picks a site, and BGP picks a route to it


Challenging to understand:

- 1. Depends on BGP routing policy and DNS caching policy outside cloud control
- 2. Difficult to conduct research in academia:
 - a. Manipulate routing (at cloud scale)
 - b. Observe ingress routing decisions and DNS caching behavior (at scale)





























- **Control:** route client to best-performing site
- Availability: fast failover to other sites

Current Techniques

- Unicast with DNS redirection
- Unicast failover (and hence availability) depends on DNS caching behavior, which depends on traffic patterns, OS behavior, and application behavior

Updates on two community resources — please use them!

PEERING BGP testbed

• Exchange BGP routes and traffic with thousands of ASes at locations around the world

Residential traffic traces

- Packet traces from ~1000 residences
 - Plan to scale to 8000 units, 24x7


Updates on two community resources — please use them!

PEERING BGP testbed

• Exchange BGP routes and traffic with thousands of ASes at locations around the world

Residential traffic traces


- Packet traces from ~1000 residences
 - Plan to scale to 8000 units, 24x7




- Columbia operates a residential ISP
 - Largest landlord in NYC
 - 8000 faculty, postdocs, and grad students (and their families) in off-campus apartments (not undergrad dorms)
 - All on Columbia network





- Largest landlord in NYC
- 8000 faculty, postdocs, and grad students (and their families) in off-campus apartments (not undergrad dorms)
- All on Columbia network...(except Ethan's building)







- Columbia operates a residential ISP
 - Largest landlord in NYC
 - 8000 faculty, postdocs, and grad students (and their families) in off-campus apartments (not undergrad dorms)
 - All on Columbia network...(except Ethan's building)







- Columbia operates a residential ISP
 - Largest landlord in NYC
 - 8000 faculty, postdocs, and grad students (and their families) in off-campus apartments (not undergrad dorms)
 - All on Columbia network...(except Ethan's building)







- Columbia operates a residential ISP
 - Largest landlord in NYC
 - 8000 faculty, postdocs, and grad students (and their families) in off-campus apartments (not undergrad dorms)
 - All on Columbia network...(except Ethan's building)
- Traffic mirrored to anonymization and collection pipeline
- Provides view of Internet activity typically invisible to academia








- Columbia operates a residential ISP
 - Largest landlord in NYC
 - 8000 faculty, postdocs, and grad students (and their families) in off-campus apartments (not undergrad dorms)
 - All on Columbia network...(except Ethan's building)
- Traffic mirrored to anonymization and collection pipeline
- Provides view of Internet activity typically in isible to academia

























How quickly can DNS fail clients over to a new site?




Unicast lacks availability in site failure scenarios




- DNS controls client-to-site mapping
- DNS update is slow due to caching, which limits availability.
 - Lower DNS TTL increases application latency.
 - TTL is often violated.
 13% of flows start after TTL expired
 Of those, 50% start > 1 min. later


Unicast lacks availability in site failure scenarios
























Routes to other sites are learned by networks and can attract traffic.







Updates on two community resources — please use them!


PEERING BGP testbed

 Exchange BGP routes and traffic with thousands of ASes at locations around the world Residential traffic traces

- Packet traces from ~1000 residences
 - Plan to scale to 8000 units, 24x7



PEERING sites - Deployed on Vultr data centers



PEERING sites - Announce from Cloudflare PoPs




PEERING site capabilities


	# sites	# neighbor ASes	exchange traffic	control BGP announcements	select outgoing routes
universities	10	~10	Y	Y	Y
IXPs	5	~1500	Y	Y	Y
Vultr	32	~6000	Y	Y	Ν
Cloudflare	335	~13,000	Y	Ν	Ν

Data collection

- Looking Glass on PEERING routers so experimenters can view routes
 - Especially useful for debugging your own experiments to check your own experiments
- Traceroutes:
 - 48 teams of 400 RIPE Atlas probes run traceroute to PEERING prefixes every 20 minutes
 - Can configure exact source probes and destination PEERING prefixes/addresses
- Route monitoring
 - Monitor route visibility of PEERING announcements from RIPE RIS
 - https://github.com/PEERINGTestbed/peeringmon_exporter
- TODO: Feed routes to RouteViews/RIS/GIII
 - Announcements that experiments make
 - Routes we learn from the Internet




Measuring anycast failover SLC Chicago LA New York Evaluation of failover time Emulate a cloud provider / CDN Ο Fail one site at a time Ο 1.1.1.0/24 1.1.1.0/24 1.1.1.0/24 1.1.1.0/24 32 locations







Measuring anycast failover









Measuring anycast failover











Measuring anycast failover























These are community resources — please use them!

PEERING BGP testbed

Residential traffic traces

These are community resources — please use them!

PEERING BGP testbed

Residential traffic traces

- Submit proposal at peering.ee.columbia.edu
- We approve and allocate you prefixes (or bring your own)

PEERING BGP testbed

- Submit proposal at peering.ee.columbia.edu
- We approve and allocate you prefixes (or bring your own)
- Set up BGP sessions with our routers to:
 - Make announcements
 - Receive and select routes
 - Exchange traffic
- Filters restrict announcements to approved capabilities for experiment

PEERING BGP testbed

- Submit proposal at peering.ee.columbia.edu
- We approve and allocate you prefixes (or bring your own)
- Set up BGP sessions with our routers to:
 - Make announcements
 - Receive and select routes
 - Exchange traffic
- Filters restrict announcements to approved capabilities for experiment
- Popular use cases include RPKI measurements: ImpROV: Measurement and Practical Mitigation of Collateral Damage of RPKI Route Origin Validation. Weitong Li, Yuze Li, **Taejoong Chung**. USENIX Security Symposium 2025

PEERING BGP testbed

- Submit proposal at <u>peering.ee.columbia.edu</u>
- We approve and allocate you prefixes (or bring your own)
- Set up BGP sessions with our routers to:
 - Make announcements
 - Receive and select routes
 - Exchange traffic
- Filters restrict announcements to approved capabilities for experiment
- Popular use cases include RPKI measurements: ImpROV: Measurement and Practical Mitigation of Collateral Damage of RPKI Route Origin Validation. Weitong Li, Yuze Li, **Taejoong Chung**. USENIX Security Symposium 2025

- Collecting since 2023 and plan to continue indefinitely
- Currently ~1000 units, 4 hrs / day
 - Plan to scale to 8000 units, 24x7

PEERING BGP testbed


- Submit proposal at <u>peering.ee.columbia.edu</u>
- We approve and allocate you prefixes (or bring your own)
- Set up BGP sessions with our routers to:
 - Make announcements
 - Receive and select routes
 - Exchange traffic
- Filters restrict announcements to approved capabilities for experiment
- Popular use cases include RPKI measurements: ImpROV: Measurement and Practical Mitigation of Collateral Damage of RPKI Route Origin Validation. Weitong Li, Yuze Li, **Taejoong Chung**. USENIX Security Symposium 2025


- Collecting since 2023 and plan to continue indefinitely
- Currently ~1000 units, 4 hrs / day
 - Plan to scale to 8000 units, 24x7
- We can share the data
- Submit IRB approval/exemption including description of data needed
- Data aggregated and anonymized as appropriate
 - Flows or packets
 - Individual (anonymized) units (rotating anonymization key), or truncated by prefix


Fundamental tradeoffs in cloud/CDN ingress routing


Technique	Control	Availability
Unicast	High	Low
Anycast	Low	High


- Existing techniques compromise control or availability
- Announcing failed site's prefix from other sites upon failure (*reactive* anycast) runs risk of turning a local failure into a widespread one, compromising *safety*
- Tradeoffs are fundamental: any technique relying on DNS + BGP for content redirection must compromise at least one of *control, availability, or safety*













- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.

	Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
	Unicast	High	Low	High
,				
	Anycast	Low	High	High




- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.

	Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
	Unicast	High	Low	High
,				
	Anycast	Low	High	High




- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.

	Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
	Unicast	High	Low	High
,				
	Anycast	Low	High	High




- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.

	Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
	Unicast	High	Low	High
,				
	Anycast	Low	High	High
	Reactive	High	High	Low




- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.


	Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
	Unicast	High	Low	High
/				
,	Anycast	Low	High	High
	Reactive 🤇	High	High	Low
				-T



- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.


	Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
	Unicast	High	Low	High
,				
	Anycast	Low	High	High
	Reactive	High	High	Low






- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.


	Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
	Unicast	High	Low	High
oactive	Superprefix Anycast	High	Medium	High
Рг	Anycast	Low	High	High
	Reactive	High	High	Low






- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.

		Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
		Unicast	High	Low	High
	ive	Superprefix	High	Medium	High
,	Proact	Superprefix Depref Anycast	Medium	High	High
		Anycast	Low	High	High
		Reactive	High	High	Low



- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.
- For each pair of goals, a new technique optimizes them while achieving better trade-offs than existing techniques.

		Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
		Unicast	High	Low	High
	ive	Superprefix	High	Medium	High
	Proact	Superprefix Depref Anycast	Medium	High	High
		Anycast	Low	High	High
		Reactive	High	High	Low



- Existing techniques compromise control or availability.
- We developed three new techniques.
- For each pair of goals, a new technique optimizes them while achieving better trade-offs than existing techniques.

	Technique	Control	Availability	Safety
	Unicast	High	Low	High
ive	Superprefix	High	Medium	High
bact	Superprefix Depref Anycast	Medium	High	High
Рд	Anycast	Low	High	High
	Reactive	High	High	Low

New approaches for cloud/CDN ingress routing enable new tradeoffs

- Existing techniques compromise control or availability
- Announcing failed site's prefix from other sites upon failure (*reactive* anycast) runs risk of turning a local failure into a widespread one, compromising *safety*
- Tradeoffs are fundamental: any technique relying on DNS + BGP for content redirection must compromise at least one of *control, availability, or safety*
- For each pair of goals, one of our new technique optimizes them while achieving better trade-offs than existing techniques. *Initial techniques at IMC 2022 (Best Short Paper)*. Improvements under submission
- Or: Use special deployments to sidestep DNS + BGP to optimize all 3 goals, without being universal *PAINTER, SIGCOMM 2023. SCULPTOR, under submission.*